Complex Feminist Conversations by Resnik, Judith
University of Chicago Legal Forum
Volume 1989 | Issue 1 Article 2
Complex Feminist Conversations
Judith Resnik
Judith.Resnik@chicagounbound.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Chicago Legal Forum
by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Resnik, Judith () "Complex Feminist Conversations," University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 1989: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1989/iss1/2
Complex Feminist Conversations
Judith Resnikt
I have the pleasure of introducing this volume, Feminism in
the Law. I begin, as will other contributors,' by sharing some of the
history of feminists in the law.
When I started teaching law in the 1970s, a senior colleague on
my faculty gave me a warning. He said: "Be careful. Don't teach in
any area associated with 'women's issues.' Don't teach family law,
don't teach sex discrimination, don't teach about wills." If I want
to be taken seriously by my colleagues, he said: "Teach the 'real'
stuff-torts, contracts, procedure, property. And don't be visibly
involved in women's issues."
At that time, I was in the midst of work on procedure, on ad-
judication, on habeas corpus, and on the rights of women in prison.
I pursued these interests; I taught courses on procedure, federal
courts, and prisoners' rights.
The longer I was in legal academia, the more I saw that my
colleague's advice was close to the mark. I was one of two women
on the law faculty at my university, and virtually all my male col-
leagues were clearly more interested in my work on procedure and
less interested in my work on the problems of women prisoners.
Further, the women to whom my male colleagues paid attention
were those who wrote about and taught the "hard" stuff, (the
"right stuff," or the "real thing")-to wit, antitrust, property, pro-
cedure, and torts. My faculty was not unique in its lack of interest
in women-related subjects. For many women teaching law in the
1970s and 1980s, the message conveyed, sometimes by speech and
sometimes by silence, was the same: If you want to be taken seri-
ously, don't talk about women's issues.
In many of the settings in which I work, I am one of very few
women. I am invited to institutions populated and controlled by
men. I know that, whenever I do identify with and speak out about
t Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center, 1989 Chair of the
Section on Women in Legal Education of the American Association of Law Schools.
I See Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Le-
gal Theory of the 1970s, 1989 U Chi Legal F 9; Wendy W. Williams, Notes From A First
Generation, 1989 U Chi Legal F 99.
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women's issues, I am at risk of being marginalized, trivialized, not
heard and hence, silenced. It is much safer in such settings to try
to pass as a man, to say: "Yes, I'm a female, but I'm the same as
the men on the faculty-I just dress a bit differently."
But "passing" proves to be impossible. First, I'm uncomforta-
ble, for such a pose seems disingenuous. Second, I'm not sure I
could hide, even if I wanted to. Third, and most importantly, I
don't want to hide. Instead, I join in a shared enterprise of femi-
nism, which is to take seriously and to help to make plain the myr-
iad experiences of women, whose voices have not much been heard
in accounts-in both scholarly and popular press-about what
women's experience of this world is.
There is a bit of good news. It is not quite as risky for some
(especially those who are white, middle class, and with sources of
income not completely derivative from men) to be women as it
used to be. As Ruth Bader Ginsburg's and Wendy Williams' essays
demonstrate,' the levels of visible oppression have diminished for
some women over the last decade. Members of some law faculties,
some law firms, and some businesses now view the very small num-
ber of women workers to be a source of embarrassment-rather
than a reflection of the "natural order." Thus, while we (who were
not the "first generation") s can and should debate the nature of
feminist enterprises, premises, goals, and strategies," we can,
should, and do gladly acknowledge our appreciation of the pain en-
dured and the successes obtained by those who preceded us.
This brief account of one aspect of my experience as a law
teacher during the era in which women law teachers were (and still
are5 ) a novelty is one example of what is to come for the reader in
this volume of essays. A first premise of feminist conversations is
' Ginsburg, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 10; Williams, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 112.
' Williams, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 99.
Compare id with Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of
Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U Chi Legal F 23. See also
Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U
Chi Legal F 139; Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U Chi Legal F 115; and Robin
L. West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U Chi Legal F 59.
' See Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on
American Law School Faculties, 137 U Penn L Rev 537 (1988). During the 1980-81 aca-
demic year women constituted 13.7 percent of the law teachers. During the 1986-87 aca-
demic year women constituted 20 percent. Id at 557. However, as Chused analyzes the data,
women are underrepresented on the faculties of "elite" law schools and are disproportion-
ately represented in the lower status jobs of law teaching. That "lower" status has been
defined by the still dominantly male-run legal profession to include such work as teaching
legal writing and teaching in clinical programs. Id at 548-55.
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that we begin with the actual experiences of women. The realities
of women's lives are central to feminist description, analysis, and
theory. Feminists understand that the work that women do and
those who think about women and women's work are often trivial-
ized. One of my favorite examples comes from the field of proce-
dure, in which, when someone wants to describe a rule or set of
activities as unimportant, the tradition has been to call the rule or
activity "housekeeping."" Of course, no one who has ever kept
house would describe trivial activities as "housekeeping." Indeed,
most human beings find that arrangements for eating and sleeping
are quite central to their lives. But, in this culture, women are seen
as responsible for enabling others to be able to eat and to sleep,
and in this culture, such tasks are devalued.
A second key issue for feminists, and one that is evident in
this symposium, is what I label the issue of "proximity." This sym-
posium is about a topic that I care deeply about, that is closer to
me than much of the other work I do. It is not that I am uninter-
ested in the other fields to which I devote much of my time. I am
passionately engaged by that other work-about adjudication, the
role of judges, the structure of courts-and those issues have and
will occupy much of my life. Indeed, law review readers will find
that three of us here, Martha Minow, Richard Posner, and myself,
have recently participated in another symposium-in honor of the
fiftieth birthday of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.7 While
the occasion may seem dry to some, the event was marked with
cake and candles and with some heated exchanges about the fed-
eral court system. Observers would have been fair to describe
many of the contributions (including my own) as prompted by
deeply-felt views of how the world is and should be ordered.
But there is a difference. My work on procedure exists at some
distance from me, for I do not daily live and breathe the structure
of the courts, the roles of judges, and the interaction between fed-
eral and state systems. But with feminism, there is no such space. I
do live and breathe in a world in which, because I am a woman law
' See, for example, Statement of Justice Black and Justice Douglas on the Promulga-
tion of Amendments to the Federal Rules, 374 US 865-66 (1963) ("We believe that while
some of the Rules of Civil Procedure are simply housekeeping details, many determine mat-
ters so substantially affecting the rights of litigants in lawsuits that in practical effect they
are the equivalent of new legislation .... ")
7 The conference, The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
sponsored by Northeastern University Law School, was held on October 7-8, 1988. See Ste-
phen Labaton, Federal Court Rules Challenged after 50 Years, NY Times B5 (Oct 14,
1988). Proceedings forthcoming in 137 U Penn L Rev 1872 (1989).
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teacher, I am an anomaly. On a daily basis, in numerous ways, my
otherness as female is brought home to me; my modes of being are
questioned. My sense is that many women and men may share the
feeling that feminist issues are close, sometimes, for some, too close
for comfort. While much of our other work is at some level about
ourselves, feminism is so plainly about ourselves, about the con-
struction of our lives and our relationships, that the protective ve-
neer of professionalism is inadequate. This proximity translates, in
practical terms, in a variety of ways. One of the artifacts of prox-
imity is that feminism is a topic that makes many people nervous.
A third complicating aspect of feminist discussions arises from
the question of audience. Since feminism takes seriously the act of
connection and interaction, feminism does and must care a lot
about not only the speaker but also the listener. So, we often ask:
"To whom are we speaking?" 8
In this volume, the answer is evident, for the readership will
be a group of individuals, both women and men, who have varying
degrees of affiliation with feminism. While talking with women is
often an act of connection, talking with men about feminism is
more complicated. One of the central aspects of feminism is an un-
derstanding that much of the activity in women's lives is directed
toward seeking approval, permission, power, and legitimation from
men. In this culture, many women are dependent upon men for
economic survival.9 In this culture, many women obtain their social
status and their names from their affiliation with men. ' In this
culture, many women live in fear of male violence.' In this culture,
most of the holders of power are-men.
Feminism is an effort to help those of us who are women to
take ourselves seriously and to enable us to give ourselves ap-
proval, permission, power and legitimation. Thus, both women and
' See, for example, Ruth Bader Ginsburg's and Barbara Flagg's discussion of the litiga-
tion choices made by those bringing women's rights cases in the 1970s and Ginsburg's sense
that, given the precedents of the time, judges and justices "needed basic education." As a
result, claims were kept "comprehensible and digestible" to avoid the risk of "losing [the]
audience." 1989 U Chi Legal F at 18 (cited in note 1). See also Martha Minow's essay, which
gives voice to what she believes is some silent criticism of feminism by those in the legal
profession. 1989 U Chi Legal F at 118 (cited in note 4).
' See generally Mary E. Becker, Politics, Differences and Economic Rights, 1989 U Chi
Legal F 169.
,o See, for example, Richard Posner's description of women who work, in terms of
women as related to men. The term chosen is "housewives" rather than "homeworkers" or
"householders." Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U Chi Legal F 191.
" Littleton, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 28 (cited in note 4); West, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 63
(cited in note 4).
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men who engage in conversations about feminism are often self-
conscious about the activity. If the activity is somehow to "ex-
plain" feminism to men, we must worry that what we are do-
ing-seeking once again male approval or the male gaze 12-is the
very antithesis of what we hope feminism will enable us to achieve.
At the same time, men may worry that they are engaged in an act
of domination or empowerment that itself expresses the very prob-
lem at hand. The task is to engage in the conversation while fight-
ing the acculturation that has for so long taught women to defer, to
acquiesce, and to mistrust ourselves when we claim a space for
ourselves."3
Given these problems-that at least some men and women do
not take the enterprise of feminism or any enterprises of women
seriously; that conversations about women's lives are, at some
level, always conversations about ourselves; and that much of the
reality of women's lives, currently, does involve seeking approval, if
not permission, from men-it is not surprising that a final compli-
cating factor for many of us who engage in feminist conversations
and writing is the issue of anger. We have to be very very careful,
because anger at the experiences of marginalization, trivialization,
and subordination is not so far from the surface. As Mary Becker
discusses in her article,' 4 despite a multitude of strategies for de-
emphasizing the conflicts between women and men, the conflicts
are really there. And so is the anger.
If one gives voice to the anger, the risks are enormous. As
Carolyn Heilbrun expressed so well:
It has been ridicule, misery and anxiety [this] patriarchy
holds in store for those who express their anger about the
enforced destiny of women . . . . Even today, after two
decades of feminism, young women shy away from an
emphatic statement of anger at the patriarchy. Perhaps
only women who have played the patriarchal game and
,2 See, for example, John Berger, Sven Blomberg, Chris Fox, Michael Dibb, and Rich-
ard Hollis, Ways of Seeing 45-64 (The BBC and Penguin Books, 1987). "Women are de-
picted in a quite different way from men-not because the feminine is different from the
masculine-but because the 'ideal' spectator is always assumed to be male and the image of
the woman is designed to flatter him. If you have any doubt that this is so, make the follow-
ing experiment. Choose . . . an image of a traditional nude. Transform the woman into a
man .... Then notice the violence which that transformation does. Not to the image, but to
the assumptions of a likely viewer." Id at 64.
" See West, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 61 (cited in note 4), delineating a woman's space
from the universality claimed by critical theorists such as Foucault and Unger.
" Becker, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 169 (cited in note 9).
6 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
won a self despite it can find the courage to consider fac-
ing the pain that the outright expression of feminism in-
evitably entails.1
5
Of course, these issues-of trivialization, proximity, subordi-
nation, and anger-are not new to feminist conversations, and hap-
pily, we have developed a series of responses. One response has
been a commitment to a mode of discourse that tries to make it
easier for others both to listen and to speak, and to learn from
silence and experience as well as from dominant voices." This
symposium exemplifies a feminist effort to engage and to dis-
cuss-to explore together rather than to attempt to prove which of
us is "smarter," to eschew efforts at intellectual domination, and to
attempt to understand perspectives, some of which are not intui-
tively obvious. We hope this symposium will in turn engender fur-
ther collegial discourse, in which many voices can be heard. How-
ever, I must record one regret as the symposium is translated from
a two-day meeting into this volume. This book will capture some of
the exchanges of those who have written essays but will not in-
clude the comments from panelist Fran Olsen,' 7 from the modera-
tors such as Jane Mansbridge and Cass Sunstein, and from mem-
bers of the audience, who made important contributions to the
conference itself and to the thinking reflected in these papers.
A second feminist response, again aimed at enabling many
voices to be heard, is to try not to speak from an imperial position.
A major shared premise is that knowledge of the world is con-
structed from one's viewpoint and that what has been assumed (by
some) to be a universal viewpoint is, in fact, a viewpoint of some
men, who have articulated a vision of reality and have claimed it to
be true for us all. One of my colleagues, Catharine Hantzis, calls
this "psychological imperialism." Is Feminists are at risk of assum-
15 Carolyn G. Heilbrun, Writing a Woman's Life 125 (W.W. Norton, 1988).
10 See West, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 66 (cited in note 4), explaining the content of the
silence of some women. See also the Dutch film, Marleen Gorris, director, A Question of
Silence (Quartet/Films Inc-Sigma Films Ltd, 1983).
17 Fran Olsen exemplified the effort, as a white woman, to be willing to "bumble along"
in public to explore some of the implications of new technologies of reproduction for black
women and for lower class women. Frances Olsen, Race, Gender, Class, remarks at the Le-
gal Forum symposium, "Feminism in the Law: Theory, Practice and Criticism," October 14-
15, 1988 (recording on file with the Legal Forum).
is Correspondence with Catharine W. Hantzis, on file with the author. See also Cathe-
rine W. Hantzis, Kingsfield and Kennedy: Reappraising the Male Models of Law School
Teaching, in Women in Legal Education-Pedagogy, Law, Theory and Practice, 38 J Legal
Educ 155 (1988). See also Littleton, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 26 (cited in note 4), warning
against translating "some women's experiences into other women's terms."
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ing that one's own experience of the world is another's experience
of the world. We must then take seriously our obligation not to
stipulate a universal "woman's experience," and to listen to women
from many classes, of different races, of differing sexual prefer-
ences, of different modes of being.1" This symposium is rich with
diversity. Kimberle Crenshaw helps to educate those of us who are
not black, as she speaks about the problems of "intersectionality"
and "compoundedness," and of the dominance of the categories of
whiteness and maleness that inhibits the willingness to attend to
black women as black, as women, and as black women.2" Chris Lit-
tleton warns us that, in acknowledging this "partiality," this plu-
ralism of feminist problems and viewpoints, we might miss seeing
what "links" us as women.21 Mary Becker examines some of the
incentives for women not to see those links.22 Martha Minow ex-
plores the connections between feminism and other social and po-
litical theories,23 while Robin West attempts to identify some of
what is "selfhood" for women.24 Thus, "we" are self-conscious
about the use of the term "we," but "we" do not permit the aware-
ness of the limits of the "we" to undermine what is shared.
Yet another important element of feminist discourse is to ap-
preciate the contributions of the variety of individuals who enable
conversations such as this to occur. Thus, I thank the students of
the Legal Forum, who created the symposium and volume of arti-
cles. Their "housework" is greatly appreciated.
See generally Sandra Harding, Other "Others" and Fractured Identities: Issues for
Epistemologists, in The Science Question in Feminism 163-96 (Cornell University Press,
1986).
'0 Crenshaw, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 139 (cited in note 4).
Littleton, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 25 (cited in note 4).
Becker, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 169 (cited in note 9).
13 Minow, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 129 (cited in note 4).
11 West, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 84 (cited in note 4).

